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Least-developed countries (LDCs) like Bangladesh could benefit from increasing demand and 
appropriate intellectual property rigths (IPRs) especially for patented agricultural and 
pharmaceutical goods. IPRs protection could be used as a vehicle for economic development 
through trade.1 By appropriating rights, the country could use its comparative advantage of 
reverse-engineering, adding value through adaptation of existing technology goods (knowledge 
goods) accessed in formal and non-formal means. However, as a part of ensuring economic 
benefits to innovators, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)2 obliges its members, irrespective of their level of 
development, to offer strict IPRs protection in knowledge goods, including comprehensive 
control on technology diffusion. In theory, protection aims to foster beneficial technological 
development furthering innovation and increasing economic growth.3  
However, quantitative research shows that IPRs do not often contribute to economic growth 
leading to economic development in countries below a development threshold of about 
US$3,400 in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), since countries at such a low level of 
development can neither 1) afford research and development (R&D), 2) or the technology, nor 
3) do they have the ability to imitate, absorb, assimilate, replicate or do duplicative imitation of 
foreign inventions to meet consumption needs or fulfill economic goals.4 In addition, 
quantitative research implies that in countries which have little ability to imitate to meet 
survival needs, standardizing IPRs protection not only restricts the previously free use of 
technology/knowledge goods, but also increases the cost of technological acquisition.5 In fact, 
 
1 Economic development commonly refers to economic performance in terms of human development and the 
human development supplements economic development by incorporating social welfare considerations and of 
sustainable development. See details, Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law 
(2008) 272. 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
3 Gino Gancia and Fabrizio Zilibotti, ‘Technological Change and the Wealth of Nations’ (2009) 1 Annual Review of 
Economics 93. 
4 See Nagesh Kumar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian 
Countries’ (Study Paper 1b, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, United Kingdom, 2002); Mark A 
Thompson and Francis W Rushing, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Patent Protection on Economic 
Growth: An Extension’ (1999) 24 Journal of Economic Development 1. They employ threshold regression techniques 
finding a threshold at an initial level of GDP of $3,400 (in 1980 dollars). For countries below this value there is no 
significant relationship between IPR protection and growth, but above, the relationship is positive and significant. 
5 Daniel Gervais, ‘TRIPS 3.0: Policy Calibration and Innovation Displacement’ in Chantal Thomas and Joel 
Trachtman (eds), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System (2009) 391-392. 
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historical analysis suggests that such free use of technology/knowledge goods once helped 
today’s developed countries to make economic progress.6  
Furthermore, in return for the inconvenient obligations, the TRIPS does not provide for 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) or trade in technology or knowledge goods that would 
aid LDCs and their economic welfare.7 However, to alleviate the restriction on use of 
technology, the TRIPS allows for some flexibilities, including compulsory licenses or farmers’ 
privileges of saving, re-sowing or exchanging seeds based on ordre public8 and morality, as well as 
certain special and differential treatment in terms of an extended deadline for compliance and 
a promise of technology transfer.9 Such exceptional treatment that legalizes informal technology 
and leads to follow-on innovations, holds some economic development prospects for LDCs, 
like Bangladesh. However, such development is placed in disencouraging circumstances, under 
a constant fear of economic sanctions, loss of market access and imposition of the TRIPS-plus 
obligations10. In addition, in apprehension of competition between developed and developing 
countries over low-cost manufacture and trade  of pharma and agri goods, the TRIPS severly 
curtails development by requiring LDCs to fulfill prerequisites for availing themselves of the 
compulsory licensing-mechanism tailored for access to patented pharmaceuticals and supplying 
domestic and export markets, or of utilizing farmers’ privileges in maintaining traditional 
farming practices.11 
 
6 Anil K Lal and Ronald W Clement, ‘Economic Development In India: The Role Of Individual Enterprise (And 
Entrepreneurial Spirit)’ (2005) 12(2) Asia-Pacific Development Journal 81. 
7 See Robert L Ostergard, ‘Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Reassessment of the 
Conventional Wisdom’ in Daniel J Gervais (ed), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development (2007) 115-55; William 
M Landes and Richard A Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (2003) 413-15. 
8 The term ‘ordre public’ is derived from French law. It is very difficult to translate it into English, and therefore the 
original French term is used in Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. It indicates concerns about matters 
threatening the social structures which bind a society together, i.e., matters that threaten the structure of civil 
society as such. 
9 Nagesh Kumar, ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Technology and Economic Development: Experiences of Asian 
Countries’ (2003) 38(3) Economic and Political Weekly 209. 
10 TRIPS plus includes any new standards that restrict the ability of member countries to: 1) promote technological 
innovation and to facilitate the transfer and dissemination of technology; 2) take necessary measures to protect 
public health, nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development; or, 3) take appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property 
rights by right holders or the resort by right holders to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely 
affect the international transfer of technology. As a result, the TRIPS plus concept covers both those activities 
aimed at increasing the level of protection for right holders beyond that which is given in the TRIPS. In addition, 
such measures reduce the scope or effectiveness of limitations on rights and exceptions under the TRIPS. See for 
details, Sisule F Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (TRIPS Issues Paper 3, Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), Geneva 
and Quaker International Affairs Programme (QIAP), Ottawa, 2003) 
<http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/WIPO(A4)final0304.pdf> 8 July 2010. 
11 M Rafiqul Islam, International Trade Law of the WTO (2006) 380. 
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Much has been written on the potential costs and benefits of the TRIPS protection for IPRs, 
particularly in developing countries, in terms of economic development determinants such as 
innovation and technology transfer. They express either critical or cautious views about the 
impact of the TRIPS on economic development, especially for LDCs.12 Among them, a number 
of reports have either claimed that the TRIPS and the current trends in international 
intellectual property rule-making, are harmful for development or suggests that some aspects of 
them may be. Such reports are for example, the Human Development Reports of 1999, 2000, 
2001 published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)13, another UNDP 
publication ‘Making Global Trade Work for People,’14 as well as the World Bank report ‘Global 
Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2002’.15  
Useful and high quality documentation has also been produced in support of developing 
countries in forums of Quaker United Nations Office, the South Centre, the International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Almost all of them invariably hold that the TRIPS ‘one-
size-fits-all’ approach to harmonizing international IPRs makes little economic sense for 
developing and least developed countries.16 These studies concur that countries, which have 
capacity for innovation or reverse-engineering, utilize the TRIPS rules and exception clauses as 
economy invigorating tools in order to manufacture and supply products  at home and abroad. 
However, even these countries, as the documents suggest, need technology-transfer or other 
technology adaptation packages for their development. The suggested packages include forming 
 
12 Dutfield and Suthersanen, above n 1, 275. 
13 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Human Development Report 1999’ [hereinafter UNDP]. 
<http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_1999_EN.pdf> 10 July 2010; UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 
2000’ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_2000_ch0.pdf> 10 July 2010; UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 
2001’ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/completenew1.pdf> 10 July 2010. 
14 UNDP, ‘Making Global Trade Work for People’ 
<http://content.undp.org/go/cms-service/stream/asset/;jsessionid=aJpGrJsxO-nd?asset_id=1948257> 10 July 
2010. 
15 World Bank, ‘Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries’ 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2002/Resources/gep2002complete.pdf> 10 July 2010. 
16 Sisule F Musungu, Rethinking Innovation, Development and Intellectual Property in the UN, WIPO and Beyond (2005) 
(TRIPS Issues Paper No. 5, Quaker International Affairs Programme) 
<http://www.qiap.ca/pages/documents/TRIPS53.pdf> 8 July 2010; Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen, 
Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of History  (Occasional Paper 15, Quaker 
United Nations Office, Geneva, August 2004) 
<http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occassional/Harmonisation-or-Differentiation.pdf> 8 July 2010; 
UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (2005) 61-91; Sisule F Musungu et al., Utilizing TRIPS 
Flexibilities for Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks (South Centre, Geneva 2004) 
<http://www.southcentre.org/publications/flexibilities/flexibilities.pdf> 8 July 2010. 
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common fund to initiate R&D and supply inputs to countries or supporting open sources of 
knowledge used in a product.17  
There is also specific analysis on the TRIPS costs and benefits in pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture, for some newly industrialized countries (NICs) and developing countries, which 
endorse striking a balanced compromise between IPRs protection and development needs.18 
The study conducted by the United Kingdom government-sponsored Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights is one of them. This study is perhaps the most thorough and widely-
publicized study on the intellectual property-development nexus.19 Its main argument is that 
due to different scientific and technological capacities and social and economic structures 
prevailing in developing countries, an optimal intellectual property system is bound to vary 
widely from country to country.20 Consequently, while it appears that developing countries that 
have relatively advanced scientific and technological capacities, like India and China, may well 
benefit from high levels of IPRs protection in some areas, many other countries, like 
Bangladesh, Senegal or Niger, are likely not to do so.  
For Bangladesh, it is not the TRIPS itself with the high protection for IPRs that would assist in 
achieving developmental objectives with innovation. Such protection measure would rather 
relegate the gradually rising pharmaceutical firms and seeds industry to low value added 
segments and hinder its economic development.21 However, the protection measure conjoined 
with other factors such as market conditions, technology development policies, education etc. is 
likely to help such least developed economy gaining technology transfer by means of attracting 
FDI, licensing, joint ventures, material transfer agreements (MTA) and others, and the 
exception clauses would hold some economy stimulations especially in agriculture and 
pharmaceuticals with reverse engineering.22 
In order to overcome concerns and give effect to the economic prospects of the TRIPS, this 
article offers policy recommendations to design a legal and infrastructural basis for this process 
in Bangladesh. With this goal in view, the study advances a model that attempts to extend IPRs 
protection, while meeting consumer needs and accommodating economic goals. Based on the 
 
17 Dutfield and Suthersanen, above n 1, 275-81; Gervais, above n 5, 363-393. 
18 For example, Anitha Ramanna, ‘Intellectual Property Rights in South Asia: Opportunities and Constraints for 
Technology Transfer’ in Suresh Chandra Babu and Asok Gulati (eds), Economic Reforms and Food Security: The 
Impact of Trade and Technology in South Asia (2005) 188-9. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (2002), 
<http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf> 20 March 2010 [hereinafter CIPR]. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Keith Maskus, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer’ in C Fink and K Maskus (eds), Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent 
Economic Research (2005) 70-1. 
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reality of the TRIPS, a standard economic theory of IPRs, the benefit of hind-sight and 
previous empirical studies of IPRs regime-changes in some NICs and developing countries, this 
article recommends some legal and technological strategies for Bangladesh that best utilize the 
TRIPS rules, the TRIPS transitional period and its clauses regarding agriculture and 
pharmaceuticals. The recommendations are drafted with the broader goals of fulfilling 
subsistence needs, increasing exports and thus, ultimately creating and enhancing economic 
development. At the same time, this study urges Bangladesh and other LDCs to join the 
international coalition pressing for a rethink of the TRIPS due to its implications and seeking 
alternatives, like the inclusion of specific and binding technology-transfer arrangements in the 
TRIPS that takes into account the actual level of development of LDCs. 
2. The Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development: Historical Analysis 
The relationship between IPRs and economic development has been complicated since the 
beginning of international system for IPRs protection in the 19th century. Developed countries 
particularly Britain and America viewed intellectual property rights as an instrument for 
promoting economic development through innovation of technology and its formal transfer.23 
At the heart of the Anglo-American IPRs system is the belief that limited monopoly rights in 
the name of IPRs are necessary to promote creativity and innovation, to transfer innovated 
technology and thus to make economic development.24 That belief is said to have based on the 
reward/justificatory theory and stamped with personality/privatisation of the property on 
achieving command over property/technology. The establishing of IPRs command over 
technology came in prevention of the then rampant informal technology diffusion through 
industrial espionage by countries such as France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium.25 
However, it is a fact that industrial espionage and inadequate protection of IPRs of foreign 
citizens helped previously most of the now-developed countries in freely accessing foreign 
technologies and causing improvements to them.26 In addition, at that point of time, patent 
laws in most countries including Britain, the US, the Netherlands, Austria, and France were 
 
23 Ha-Joon Chang, Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of State (2003) 278. 
24 Ramanna, above n 18, 188-9. 
25 For instance, in the 1950s, a former Manchester textile finisher and Jacobite office, John Holker, was appointed 
as Inspector General of Foreign Manufacturers in the French government. While also advising French producers 
on technological problems, his main activity under this euphemistic job title consisted of industrial espionage and 
suborning of British skilled workers. See J Harris, Industrial espionage and Technology Transfer: Britain and France in 
the Eighteen Century (1998) 21. 
26 Kumar, above n 4. 
 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#2 
6
very lax on checking the originality of the invention and often explicitly allowed patenting of 
imported inventions by their nationals.27 For example, in the US, before the 1836 restoration 
of the patent law, patents were granted without any proof of originality. This not only led to the 
patenting of imported technologies but also encouraged racketeers to engage in rent-seeking by 
patenting devices already in use and by demanding money from their users under threat of suits 
for IPRs infringement.28  
With the introduction of such rent-seeking IPRs laws in an increasing number of national 
jurisdictions and their trade presence in international arena, the pressures for an international 
IPRs regime naturally started growing from the late-19th century. After several attempts, IPRs get 
codified in an international regime comprising of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) paving the way for achieving economic development 
through innovation and guided technology transfer. However, with the ineffectiveness and 
flexibility of the IPRs protection regime due to shorter period of protection and limited scope, a 
private good turns public once a good has been supplied and it allows an individual to get 
access to it free of charge without reducing the availability of the good to other individuals. 
Such trend of public goods encouraging informal technology transfer assists individuals to easily 
copy the information. With taking on such option, even the most developed countries were 
routinely violating the IPRs of other countries’ citizens well into the 20th century. For example, 
as late as in the late-19th century, Britain was in a great concern with its IPRs violation by 
Germany who was at that time about to technologically overtake Britain.29 
The continuation of such trend of public goods encouraging informal technology transfer also 
helps some NICs to develop.30 In fact, countries that possess reverse engineering capacity adopt 
the policy of freely using technology. For example, this free use-cum informal technology 
transfer brings in economic development to South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Brazil in the 
pre-TRIPS era.31 Countries like China, India, Argentina, Malaysia and others also make good 
use of such policy and become competitors to industrialized countries. In addition to 
appropriation of technologies, the favourable market conditions also enable these NICs or 
developing countries to attract FDI, and lead the economy to a progress. They believe a certain 
level of technology and capital requires before higher levels of IPRs will assist in development 
since they find that piracy of IPRs benefited many of the developed world earlier in promoting 
 
27 W A Dolfsma, ‘IPRs, Technological Development, and Economic Development’ (Research Paper ERS-2006-004-
ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), Erasmus University, 2006). 
28 Ha-Joon, above n 23, 279. 
29 D Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to 
the Present (1969) 328. 
30 Ha-Joon, above n 23, 281-2. 
31 Keith E Maskus and Jerome H Reichman, ‘The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization 
of Global Public Goods’ (2004) 7(2) Journal of International Economic Law 279. 
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economic development. For this, many developing nations did not recognize patents on 
medicines and agriculture. However, most of the LDCs fail to grossly avail of the IPRs flexibility 
since they lack either the infrastructure necessary (e.g. presence of patents on medicines and 
agriculture) to engage in piracy or conditions that attract FDI, or capabilities/finance to afford 
technology and negotiation to press developed countries to transfer technology to them in 
consideration of development needs.32  
As a way out to fulfil development needs in the existing context, developing countries that do 
not have R&D capacity to introduce innovation based economic development have long sought 
to use both national policies and international agreements to stimulate international 
technology transfer for making economic prosperity. They adopted national policies moving 
from the general, such as education and IPRs protection, to the specific, such as tax incentives 
for purchase of certain types of capital equipment. To this effect, various agreements are also 
furnished between countries but agreements regarding actions that governments should pursue 
to encourage international technology transfer are largely of a best-endeavour nature. So, there 
arises the necessity to have a binding international agreement.33 
With the view to effectuate technology transfer in a binding international agreement, the first 
official attempt to challenge the Paris Convention-led IPRs regime for failing to meet the 
development needs of poor countries was made in 1961, when Brazil submitted a draft 
resolution co-sponsored by Bolivia to a committee of the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly. The draft put forward various concerns including the access to knowledge and 
experience in science and technology that is often limited by patents and similar arrangements 
designed to protect the right of ownership and exploitation of investors of new processes, 
techniques and products. Brazil also requested the Secretary General to prepare a report 
especially containing an indication of possibility of revising IPRs legislation in accordance with 
principles of international law, with a view to permitting the rapid absorption of new products 
and techniques to accelerate the rate of economic development.34 
The International Bureaus for Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) were alarmed by the tone of such initiatives which actually seek 
to shift deliberations on patent standard-setting to the UN General Assembly. In response, they 
lobbied for a radical change of the tone. This move came to a success with the General 
Assembly Resolution 1713(XVI) entitled ‘The Role of Patents in the transfer of technology to 
 
32 Sanjaya Lall, ‘Indicators of the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries’ (Issue Paper No. 3, 
UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, June 2003). 
33 Bernard M Hoekman, Keith E Maskus, and Kamal Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: 
Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’ (2005) 33(10) World Development 1587. 
34 Ibid. 
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under-developed countries’.35 The Resolution was much liked by both the ICC and BIRPI 
since it shifted the terms of reference of the requested Secretary General’s report in a less 
patent-hostile direction.36 
However, the patent hostility towards developing countries remained. This led the UN system 
to provide spaces for such dislike to be publicized. In 1964 when the first meeting of the 
UNCTAD was held, it adopted a Resolution recommending inter alia that: 
Developed countries should encourage the holders of patented and unpatented 
technology to facilitate the transfer of licenses, know-how, technical documentation, 
and in general to developing countries, including the financing of the procurement of 
licenses and related technology on favourable terms.37 
The Resolution also calls for organizing additional facilities for information on and for the 
transfer of technical documentation and know–how within the UN framework in consultation 
with appropriate international organizations.38 
In the same year, the UN Economic and Social Council adopted a Resolution. It concurred 
that access to knowledge and experience in the field of applied science and technology would 
facilitate the continued development of industrialization and international economic 
relations.39 
In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted two documents namely, the Declaration on the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International economic Order.40 However, neither dealt explicitly with 
intellectual property. They both covered technology transfer in ways that implied dissatisfaction 
with the international intellectual property regime for failing to contribute in this regard. Such 
ways appeared as a code of conduct for technology transfer and led to negotiations under the 
UNCTAD on a draft International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology. However, no 
final agreement could be reached.41 
 
35 United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/1713(XVI) <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/66/IMG/NR016766.pdf?OpenElement> 8 July 2010. 
36 S P Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights: National and International Protection (1975) 171-4. 
37 United Nations Secretary General, ‘The Role of Patents in the Transfer of Technology for Developing 
Countries’ 1964 [Document E/3681]. 
38 Dutfield and Suthersanen, above n 1, 272-80. 
39 Economic and Social Council Resolution 1027 (XXXVII), 13 July – 15 August 1964 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/760/56/IMG/NR076056.pdf?OpenElement> 10 July 2010. 
40 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S-6/3201 <http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3201.htm> 8 July 2010 and 
A/RES/S-6/3202 <http://www.un-documents.net/s6r3202.htm> 8 July 2010. 
41 Dutfield and Suthersanen, above n 1, 272-80. 
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A similar lack of consensus arose in the early 1980s from efforts by a group of developing 
countries (Group 77) at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to revise the 
Paris Convention but it failed with opposition to such measures from many of the developed 
countries and also due to differences among the developing countries themselves.42 
In order to break the deadlock, the TRIPS Agreement was adopted in 1995. It calls on 
countries to enforce comprehensive minimum standards of IPRs protection on a non-
discriminatory basis. It also contains provisions relating to technology transfer, as discussed 
later in this article. In 2001, WTO members established a Working Group on Trade and 
Technology Transfer to examine the relationship between trade and technology transfer and 
explore ways to increase technology flows to developing countries in consideration of their 
development needs.43 
However, the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement makes the relationship between IPRs and 
economoc development evermore complicated. This is because the TRIPS puts the policy cart 
before the empirical horse by equating the introduction of a TRIPS-compatible level of IPRs 
protection with an increase in trade and consequently economic development for all countries 
alike.44 This equation seems flawed especially when measured in terms of welfare increases.45 
With the TRIPS in place, the scope, depth, and enforcement of IPRs is likely to differ between 
countries according to their economic and political institutions, and ability to engage in and 
disseminate the fruits of inventions.46 In addition, the TRIPS underestimates the development 
needs of developing countries. This is because the development needs are based on IPRs-
appropriation with the use of flexibilities. However, the TRIPS framework merely serves 
profiteering interests of developed countries and restricts less developed countries from their 
existing economy invigorating measures of flexibilities. One is reminded by Thomas Jefferson, 
who describes the treaty’s sufficient flexibility in responding to the needs of a developing society 
as one of the most crucial elements for achieving growth.47  
From the above discussion, it appears that in the pre-TRIPS era there has generally been an 




44 WG Park and D Lippoldt, ‘International Licensing and the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries’, (OECD document TD/TC/WP(2004)31/FINAL, 21 December 2004).  
45 C Fink and CA Primo Braga, ‘How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Affects International 
Trade Flows’ in C Fink and Keith Maskus (eds), Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic 
Research (2005) 19-37. 
46 La Croix and Konan, ‘Have developing countries gained from the marriage between Trade Agreements and 
Intellectual Property Rights?’ (Economics Working Paper No. 06-5, University of Hawaii – Manoa, 2006). 
47 Zorina Khan and Kenneth L Sokoloff, ‘Historiacl Perspectives on Patent Systems in Economic Development’ in 
Neil Weinstock Netanel (ed), The Development Agendas: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries (2009) 
215-243. 
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technology transfer and economic development enabling countries to become significant 
producers of innovations and new technology as seen in Korea and India.48 As the IPRs regimes 
strengthened, NICs and some developing countries coped up with and became champion in 
creation and trade of cheaper technology but developing and least developed countries felt for 
fine-tuning technology transfer provisions in the IPRs regimes. In line with the formative 
economic development history, Bangladesh follows largely the pursuit of informal technology 
transfer in absence of local R&D and technology access through FDI. However, until the 1970s 
and 1980s most of the economy relied on the traditional agricultural sector due to lack of 
human resources and scientific and technological infrastructure, and resulted in low levels of 
industrial development. With liberal economic policies introduced worldwide in 1990s, such 
state of petite development prompts an LDC like Bangladesh to have some dependence on 
foreign technology either through FDI or informal technology transfer i.e. copying and 
imitation of foreign technology as a good alternative tool for its economic development.49 Policy 
reform was also initiated through Structural Adjustment Programs and Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Programs that were initiated in 1982, 1985-1986 and then again in 1991-1992, 
which resulted in a unilateral trade liberalization of Bangladesh’s economy.50  
3. The Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Theoretical Background 
There are many theoretical and empirical studies determining the impact of IPRs on economic 
growth that leads to economic development.51 However, only a few studies have been done for 
non-OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries, 
particularly LDCs, mainly because of problems relating to the collection of data. Some studies 
are based on economic theory, while others are based on empirical research with country- 
 
48 Kumar, above n 4. 
49 Carlos M Correa, ‘Pro-competitive Measures under TRIPs to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing 
Countries’ in Peter Drahos and Ruth Mayne (eds), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and 
Development (2002) 41.  
50 Padmashree Gehl Sampath, ‘Intellectual Property and Innovation in Least Developed Countries: 
Pharmaceuticals, Agro-Processing and Textiles and RMG in Bangladesh’ (Background Paper No. 9, The Least 
Developed Countries Report 2007, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2007); M A Hossain and MD Karunarathne, ‘Export 
Response to the Reduction of Anti–export Bias: Empirics from Bangladesh’ (Discussion Paper No. 303, School of 
Economics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, 2002); C A F Dowlah, ‘Bangladesh’ in M D Ingco (ed), 
Agriculture, Trade and the WTO in South Asia (2003). 
51 Rod Falvey, Neil Foster, and David Greenaway, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth’ (2006) 
10(4) Review of Development Economics 700; Walter G Park and Juan Carlos Ginarte, ‘Intellectual Property Rights 
and Economic Growth’ (1997) 15(3) Contemporary Economic Policy 51; D M Gould and W C Gruben, ‘The Role of 
Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth’ (1996) 48(2) Journal of Development Economics 323. 
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specific analysis. The economic studies proceed on the assumption that every country in 
trade with strong IPRs protection will benefit, and therefore, a positive relationship exists 
between strong IPRs and economic growth leading to development.52 This assumption is based 
on the fact that IPRs in general contribute to economic development by ensuring rewards to 
innovators for bringing new technologies and products to market.53 Based on the same 
hypothesis it is claimed that the hope of economic rewards coming out of strong IPRs 
persuades innovating countries to transfer technologies to developing and least developed 
countries.54  
However, the economic benefit-argument, which developed countries use in trying to convince 
developing countries to adopt strong protection measures, seems based on unstable ground. 
First, adopting stronger IPRs regimes in developing and least-developed countries promotes the 
economic growth of developed countries, possibly to the detriment of the economic 
development of developing and least-developed countries.55 Second, the evidence suggests that 
unless LDCs enhance the skill-level or absorptive capacity of domestic firms in improving their 
productivity56 and contain IPRs in competition policies or make them responsive to taxes, trade 
practices, tariffs, or contract laws, strengthening IPRs to a certain extent offsets its growth-
enhancing benefits, since it requires domestic firms to shift from imitation to innovation and 
to facilitate other activities with growth-enhancing technology spillovers.57 However, empirical 
research shows that countries like Senegal and Niger, who have IPRs laws similar to those of 
developed countries and tend to protect foreign IPRs, still struggle in making economic 
progress and are not fulfilling consumption needs and economic goals. Yet, they face the 
’development dilemma’ by receiving political and economic threats for not protecting foreign 
IPRs and promoting others’ economic growth.58 Consequently, as the empirical evidence shows 
that for developing and least developed countries, IPRs monopolise subsistence goods, impede 
technology transfer, and restrict the country’s comparative advantage in reverse-engineering, 
 
52 Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy (2000) 150. 
53 Alireza Naghavi, ‘Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer’ (2007) 
143(1) Review of World Economics 55; Robert Sherwood, ‘Some Things Cannot be Legislated’ (2002) 10 Cardozo 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 37, 39-40; Keith Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development’ (2000) 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 471. 
54 Gervais, above n 5, 391-392. 
55 Dov Greenbaum, ‘Determining Optimal Levels of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Nations: Is 
Less Really More? Is More Really Less?’ (2009) 97(11) Current Science 1604. 
56 Daniel Gervais, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and Impact on Economic Development’ 
in P K Yu (ed), Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in Digital Age (2007) 23- 72. 
57 Maskus and Reichman, above n 31, 279; James Boyle, ‘A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual 
Property’ [2004] Duke Law and Technology Review 0009. 
58 CIPR, above n 20; Anselm Kamperman Sanders, ‘Intellectual Property Treaties and Development’ in Daniel 
Gervais (ed), Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus 
Era (2007)157-70; Srividhya Ragavan, ‘The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in 
PhRMA v Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement’ (2004) 38 University of Richmond Law Review 777, 789. 
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with the consequence of putting off meeting consumption needs and increasing economic 
welfare.59 In contrast, countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil have enhanced the 
absorptive capacity of their domestic firms improving their productivity by using a soft IPRs 
regime in the pre-TRIPS era, strengthened IPRs post-TRIPS to progress by accessing technology 
(transferred from developed countries), making inventions with minor adaptations of existing 
technologies, protecting these inventions from infringement, and hence encouraging domestic 
firms to increase investments and productivity. This method allowed them to finally change 
their status to NICs.60 
It thus appears that IPRs protection help innovating western countries to make gradual 
economic progress, since IPRs in the name of patents, trademarks and trade secrets afford firms 
greater certainty that they will face only limited threats of uncompensated appropriation. This 
certainty induces them to trade and license their technologies and products more readily, 
enhancing their diffusion into the economy. Nevertheless, such security for investment through 
IPRs protection brings in economic insecurity for developing and least developed countries in 
fulfilling their development needs based mostly on IPRs- appropriation. This is because for 
countries at a lower level of development that cannot afford R&D or technology, IPRs 
protection is of no use in initiating innovation-based economic development. However, for 
them strengthening IPRs would benefit technology transfer-based economic development when 
they attain certain level of technology-absorption capacity and make small investments in small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs). And for protecting such investments against unfair 
competition and misappropriation,  IPRs protection especially patent or trademark would be of 
a great necessity for them. Lack of such IPRs protection is likely to strangle their own technical 
change-based innovations, and thus hamper their creativity with patent or trademark 
infringement.61 In addition, inadequate IPRs protection makes countries dependent on 
dynamically inefficient firms that rely on counterfeiting and imitation.62 Such circumstances 
make developing and least developed countries with technology absorption capability (for 
example, Bangladesh) feeling obligated to have IPRs systems that favour information-diffusion 
 
59 Carlos M Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy 
Options 18-19; Mark Ritchie, Kristin Dawkins, and Mark Vallianatos, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity: 
The Industrialization of Natural Resources and Traditional Knowledge’ (1996) 11 St. John's Journal of Legal 
Commentary 431; Daryl Lim, ‘Innovation and Access: Legal Strategies at the Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Law Interface’ in Antoine Masson and Mary J Shariff (eds), Legal Strategies: How Corporations Use Law 
to Improve Performance (2010) 403-37. 
60 Carlos M Correa, ‘Can the TRIPs Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?’ in Keith Maskus and 
Jerome H Reichman (eds), International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalised Intellectual Property 
Regime (2005) 227-8. See also Kumar, above n 4. 
61 R Evenson and L Westphal, ‘Technological Change and Technology Strategy’ in J Behrman and T N Srinivasan 
(eds), Handbook of Development Economics (1995) 2209-2300. 
62 Maskus, above n 53, 479-81. 
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through low-cost acquisition of foreign products and technologies.63 So, it appears that there 
exists relationship between IPRs and economic development and it is most likely dependent on 
the determinants of innovation and technology transfer.64 
3.2. Innovation as a Determinant to Economic Development 
In intellectual property-economic development nexus, innovation is but one ingredient of a 
complex recipe.65 IPRs rules allow local consumers and industry gain lawful access to 
innovations i.e. knowledge products and services for making further innovations.66 For 
example, through publication patent claims in innovations allow rival firms to use the 
information in them to imitate/develop further inventions.67 
Insofar as developing countries are concerned, innovation for them often proceeds through 
imitation of foreign technology and products, which requires some technical skills, then 
modification or improvements of the technology.68 Intellectual property rights play a significant 
role in encouraging such innovation, product development, and technical change by 
stimulating acquisition and dissemination of new information.69 A recent paper by Chen and 
Puttitanun which made empirical research on a sample of 64 developing countries using panel 
data over the period 1975-2000 shows that domestic innovation in a country increases in its 
protection of IPRs and its level of development.70 Two similar studies by Kanwar and World 
Bank also find that innovations proceeding through imitation of foreign technology and 
 
63 Ulrike Pokorski da Cunha, Study on the Viability of High Quality Drugs Manufacturing in Bangladesh (2007) 26-8 
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH commissioned by Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Eschborn , Germany 2007). 
64 Keith E Maskus, ‘Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective’ [2001] 
University of Illinois Law Review 457. 
65 The other drivers are trade, finance, migration and aid. See I Goldin and K Reinert, Globalization for 
Development: Trade, Finance, Aid, Migration and Policy (2007) 21-46; Samuel Adams, 'Globalization and Income 
Inequality: Implications for Intellectual Property Rights' (2008) 30 Journal of Policy Modeling 725. 
66 K Maskus, ‘The Economics of Global Intellectual Property and Economic Development: A Survey’ in Peter K Yu 
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the Law of Patents, Fourteenth Session, Geneva, 25-29 January 2010) 
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products lead to an increase in agricultural or industrial production in less developed 
countries that could have positive effect on economic development.71 However, for most of the 
least developed countries as far as economic development through innovation is concerned, 
there is no clear domestic economic benefit in maintaining strong IPRs protection for 
innovation since they lack R&D to promote innovation.72  
Nevertheless, in an LDC like Bangladesh who can afford a little technology and possess some 
absorption capacity, IPRs especially trademark protection is likely to encourage innovation 
through product development and opening of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) including 
ready-made garments (RMG), or benefits pharmaceutical generic manufacturers. In Bangladesh, 
the RMG industry claims to have a strong interest in designing apparel of high quality and style 
targeting European and North-American markets. With the strong enforcement of trademark 
laws, this sector is likely to create further competition among entrepreneurs with quality 
product, creation of broader markets, earning foreign currency, and furthering the country’s 
economic development. Trademark protection also carries prospects in the food products 
sector, where legitimate firms would flourish with the assurance that rivals will not be passing 
off consumer goods, such as soft drinks (coconut drink), processed foods (shrimps, chutneys, 
sauces) and spices under their trademarks. Related prospects are also therein with innovative 
producers in the cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, leather, ceramics, and metal products sectors. 
Thus, IPRs especially trademark protection is likely to hold bright prospects for SMEs with local 
product development and establishment of new enterprises if they are not muffled by 
infringement with lower quality and loss of reputation.  
In addition, Bangladesh possesses lively copyright industries including publishing, 
entertainment comprising of film, television, and music, and software. However, weak 
protection and enforcement, lower-quality copies are widely available and hampering the 
economy’s domestic cultural and technological development.73 With strong protection of 
copyright, there could be more innovative writers, film producers, musicians, and software 
industries whose creations could successfully be exported to neighbouring economies or in 
developed economies where expatriate people are living. 
 
71 Sunil Kanwar, ‘Intellectual Property Protection and Technology Transfer: Evidence From US Multinationals’ 
(Economics Working Paper Series 2007-05, Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 
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3.3.  Technology Transfer as a Determinant to Economic Development 
3.3.1 Theoretical Background 
The relationship between IPRs and economic development through the determinant of 
technology transfer is ambiguous in theory and depends on a country’s circumstances. In 
theory, IPRs can play a positive role in knowledge diffusion, since the information available in 
patent claims is available to other potential inventors. In addition, strong IPRs protection may 
encourage technology transfer in the process by which a firm in one country gains access to and 
employs technology developed in another country. For this, the IPRs-consistent technology 
transfer from countries at the technological frontier is considered to be one of the main 
potential benefits of the IPRs system and an essential economic development determinant 
along with market liberalization and deregulation, technology development policies and 
competition regimes, and a low level of corruption, particularly for developing countries that 
tend not to innovate significantly.74 This theoretical claim that strengthening IPRs increases the 
transfer of technology by MNCs to reforming countries is tested in a study by Branstetter et al. 
who use affiliate level data on the United States’ (US) MNCs and aggregate patent data. The 
results suggest that technology transfer is higher following IPR reforms, with an increase in 
technology transfer, as measured by intra-firm royalty payments from parent firms to affiliates 
located in IPRs reforming countries.75 However, such theoretical and country specific prospects 
appear to be a misfit for LDCs since stronger IPRs protection can also restrict the diffusion of 
technology, with patents preventing others from using proprietary knowledge and the increased 
market power of IPRs holders potentially reducing the dissemination of knowledge due to 
lower output and higher prices in LDCs.76 
Now it stands that the IPRs-consistent technology transfer brings in economic benefits either to 
transferors or transferees or both. With such traits in place, international technology transfer 
occurs sometimes between willing partners in formal transactions, but much comes through 
non-market transactions or spillovers i.e. informal channels. Formal technology transfer takes 
place by trade in goods and services, with imports of goods having the potential to formally 
transfer knowledge through reverse engineering, but also through the cross-border learning of 
 
74 Rod Falvey and Neil foster, ‘The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer and Economic 
Growth: Theory and Evidence’ (Working Paper, United Nations Industrial Development Organizations, Vienna, 
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Investment’ in Peter K. Yu (ed), Intellectual Property and Information Wealth: Issues and Practices in the Digital Age 
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production methods, product design, organizational structure and market conditions.77 
Another formal channel is FDI, inward FDI in particular, with MNCs expected to deploy 
advanced technology to their subsidiaries that may be diffused to host-country firms.78 
Licensing, which is a further means of technology diffusion involves the purchase of production 
and distribution rights for a product and the knowledge required to make effective use of these 
rights.79 The movement of skilled workers across borders can also act as a formal channel for 
international technology diffusion.80 The non-market channels include imitation, the 
movement of personnel from one firm to another taking with them specific knowledge of their 
original firm’s technologies, data in patent applications and the temporary migration of people 
such as scientists and students to universities and research institutes in advanced countries.81 
With the aim to maximise economic benefits out of technology, IPRs-consistent standards come 
into play for technology diffusion and encourage technology transfer in the way of international 
trade, FDI, licensing, and joint venture in almost all fields of technology for a country.82  
3.3.2.  International Trade/Imports 
With the security of investment in products, IPRs protection leads significantly to higher trade 
or import flows of IPRs-sensitive goods, services or inputs to a country.83 However, it is often 
found that MNCs do not base their export decisions on IPRs in the poorest countries since 
such countries have the weakest local threats of imitation and reverse engineering.84 Usually, on 
taking imports or trade, local consumers and industries in countries with technology absorption 
capacity gain lawful access to those products and services. The access to foreign inputs and 
technology goods enables local industries to reverse engineer the imported products and learn 
from them, or enable the imported equipment to impart advanced techniques with aim to 
increase the productivity and may result in welfare gains for importing countries.85 However, 
the welfare gains vary by country, being greater in countries with stronger absorptive capacities 
 
77 Michael Blakeney, ‘A Critical Analysis of the TRIPS Agreement’ in Meir Perez Pugatch (ed), The Intellectual 
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(as measured by the level of local education attainment and research and development 
investments).86 In addition, increased trade flows may lead to new jobs in distributorships and 
their retail sector although these are likely to be low-skilled, low-paying positions. There also 
may be significant gains in terms of product quality and reliability, most notably in the area of 
high tech industries like pharmaceuticals although high tech firms may decide to serve foreign 
markets through FDI and licensing, so that exports in such industries may be little affected by 
variations in the degree of IPRs protection.87 This may also however lead to price increases 
especially when goods whose status changes to pirate or counterfeit after the introduction of 
IPRs protection are displaced by genuine goods sold at a higher price.88 Furthermore, while 
stronger IPRs protection may increase imports of high-tech goods, it also increases imports of 
low-tech consumer goods and may lead to the decline of indigenous industries relying on 
informal technology transfer especially imitation.89 
3.3.3.  Foreign Direct Investment 
IPRs protection is now-a-days considered as a pre-condition for FDI. Economic analysis also 
shows that sufficient IPRs protection is an essential component of increased inward FDI and 
trade flows in IPRs-sensitive goods for countries cherishing to make economic development 
since the IPRs-initiated FDI brings in investment securities for IPRs-owning countries through 
effective rent payments.90 FDI transfers technology from the parent firm to the subsidiary or 
through labour mobility between subsidiaries and domestic enterprises or through vertical FDI 
where different plants produce products that can be used by the plant above it as an input to 
their product,91 and helps technological goods produced by subsidiaries to find uses locally or 
creates jobs boosting the local economy.92 In addition, such transfers help recipient countries 
develop their own capacity to export high-tech goods and learn-by-exporting.93 However, most of 
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the studies conducted so far show that such countries require a minimum economic 
development threshold, technology absorption capacity and large market conditions.94 
Despite the role of IPRs in attracting FDI and ultimately following-on innovations, required 
with other components for economic development, some studies illustrate IPRs as technology 
transfer obstacle since MNCs are often likely to avoid transfer of their technology through FDI 
on the ground of having not strong enough IPRs therein, in spite of these countries’ efforts in 
paying costs for technology.95 To test this assumption, Smarzynska examines 24 transition 
economies and finds that weak IPRs regimes deter FDI in high-tech sectors (i.e. drugs, cosmetics 
and health-care products, chemicals, machinery and equipment and electrical equipment) with 
some evidence suggesting that FDI is deterred in other industries too.96 In 14 countries 
surveyed, Lee and Mansfield find stronger evidence that the strength of IPRs affects the volume 
and composition of the US MNCs’ FDI decisions in host countries.97 However, it is also found 
in other studies that IPRs play less of a role in high-tech industries due to the difficulty in 
imitating these industries’ products, while in low-tech industries other factors may be more 
important in determining FDI flows.98 
Having realized the role of FDI in economic development, government officials from a range of 
economies have pointed to strengthened IPRs as a floorboard in their strategies to enhance FDI 
inflows and trade.99 For example, experts in some poor developing countries have seen the 
institution of trademark protection as a vehicle for reassuring investors in manufacturing 
industries that they can combat knock-offs. For wealthier countries, enhancement of IPRs may 
be seen as a means to draw in high technology that can boost worker productivity and 
contribute to intensification of growth.100 This realization is reflected in the empirical research 
of Qian who analyses a sample of 92 countries from 1978 to 2002. She finds technology 
transfer primarily proxied by FDI establishments and the subsidiaries established by MNCs in 
the country of interest as the most successful IPRs-driven economic development component.101 
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However, in a recent analysis of the FDI component and its relation to IPRs, Professor Yu 
shows on China that the growth of FDI does not seem to be correlated to increases in the level 
of intellectual property protection or political reforms. This suggests that in some cases at least, 
there are considerations of geopolitical realities that trump intellectual property concerns.102 
3.3.4.  Licensing  
IPRs protection increases licensing since MNCs are mostly unwilling or hesitant to license their 
high-tech technologies to unaffiliated firms in countries with weak patent rights.103 A study 
demonstrates that IPRs protection brings widespread licensing of new technologies in Japan 
and helps it to improve its system of utility models, which contributed positively and 
significantly to its post war rise to productivity.104 However, studies also show that when MNCs 
license their technologies to unaffiliated firms in countries with weak patent rights, they are 
very often found to charge excessive fees in security of their investments in R&D.105 Such 
higher fees may lead to price increases of products making them inconsumable for the LDCs 
people. In addition, an increase in IPRs strength in these countries, while reducing the risk of 
imitation slightly, would also increase the monopoly power of the licensor.106 
There are other ways of technology transfer like joint ventures which combine many of the 
properties of FDI and licensing and hence will also involve technology transfer. In such a case 
IPRs is an issue with other factors of market conditions.107 
From the discussion above, it appears that IPRs can directly stimulate local innovations as well 
as indirectly encourage the transfer of technologies that foster local innovations. For most 
developed countries, strengthening IPRs raises growth at least partly, due to increased 
innovation and technology dissemination. However, for developing and least developed 
countries as the evidence suggests there needs initially some weak IPRs system that helps these 
countries to shift from imitation to innovation. The development experience of India is an 
example where weak IPRs protection helps it in building up local capabilities in 
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pharmaceuticals.108 However, it is also evident in some cases that stronger IPRs protection 
encourages foreign firms to transfer technology in LDCs since most LDCs will not have 
significant imitative or innovative capability in the near future.109  
In the age of global trade, the costs and benefits arising out of the relation between intellectual 
property rights and economic development demand much attention for an LDC like 
Bangladesh.110 Previously, the economic development in Bangladesh largely depends on 
traditional agriculture and trading and services of products chiefly reverse-engineered of low 
technologies informally acquired. And, for economic development through innovations, 
Bangladesh does not have in fact sustainable R&D infrastructure in the most fields of 
technology or to a great extent it cannot afford the cost of formal technology transfer by way of 
licensing for follow-on innovations or reverse engineering.111 Such stumpy economic progress 
disjointed with technology does not necessitate Bangladesh to take up the challenge of merging 
intellectual property rights with economic development. However, being included in the 
outskirt of trade liberalization, Bangladesh intends to achieve economic development entering 
others’ market with its products and opening its market especially for foreign direct investment 
by lowering tariffs, removing trade restrictions, granting privileges to FDI and enforcing IPRs.112 
However, such aspirations of achieving economic development put an LDC like Bangladesh in 
the obligations of protecting others’ intellectual property rights, not for exclusively protecting its 
own economic interests.113  
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4. TRIPS Agreement and Economic Development: Implications and 
Challenges 
4.1 Theoretical Background 
Being lagged behind developing countries in terms of competition in cheaper technology trade, 
industrialised countries claim that free-riding discourages industry to invest in goods, and leads 
to underproduction of innovative commodities. This logic has also been extended to suggest 
that industry would not invest in countries where IPRs protection was weak. Subsequently due 
to strong lobbying from developed country industries, the TRIPS Agreement appears with 
extensive IPRs protection and lays down the ground rules for what must be protected by some 
kind of intellectual property right including plant varieties and pharmaceuticals.114 This 
standard-setting streamlines the use and licensing of technology and trademarks to independent 
firms, subsidiaries and joint ventures115 and is believed to secure the IPRs owners’ rent-seeking 
interests.116 The TRIPS also incorporates some disjointed technology use or transfer provisions 
in Articles 7, 8, 24, and 66.2 on the face of huge resentment over streamlining of IPRs. 
However, such standardarisation of technology transfer provisions holds monopolised approach 
and restricts developing and least developed countries’ use, reverse engineering or imitation 
and adaptation of patented technologies to develop new technology and thus leading to less 
competition and thus innovation.117  
This dubious role of the TRIPS itself in technology transfer questions the promotion of 
economic development objective as inserted in the TRIPS Preamble and in the body especially 
for a developing or least developed country. For its protective approach in relation to 
subsistence goods with the extent and duration of IPRs protection, some commentators are of 
the opinion that the TRIPS Agreement keeps up fused relationships with economic 
development insofar as investments interests of developed countries are secured and 
developmental needs of developing and least developed countries are concerned.118 There are 
other commentators who describe the relation as frustrating for the economic developmental 
objectives as enunciated in the neo-liberalising WTO due to the TRIPS’ monopolised and 
competition fearing attitude as regards technology and its dissemination to least developed 
countries.119 Commentators like Jerome Reichman finds the TRIPS friendly with innovating 
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countries’ economy uplifting but at the same time terms this trend as one-sided drive to re-
regulate the worldwide economy from an uneven position between developing and developed 
countries since the streamlining of technology use and its diffusion leads to less innovation and 
consequently hinders global economic development in the long run.120  
From the discussion above, it appears that the TRIPS role in driving economic development is 
assessed through the economic development variables of innovation and technology transfer.  
4.2.  Strengthening IPRs in the TRIPS and Innovation based Economic Development 
The main argument for strengthening IPRs in the TRIPS is to provide better conditions for 
appropriability of innovations. Evidence shows that strengthening IPRs improves prospects for 
innovative enterprises in developing nations to develop new products and enter markets.121 
However, evidence also shows that the TRIPS encourages domestic innovation in countries 
having significant domestic capacity for innovation and development but it has little impact on 
innovation in countries with a small innovative capacity.122 In addition, strengthening IPRs 
particularly patent protection varies from industry to industry and is most effective only in 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries.123 In a study, Mansfield shows that around 65 per cent 
of pharmaceutical and 30 per cent of chemical inventions would not have taken place but for 
patent protection. And such inventions could take place in developed countries that invested in 
R&D, and strengthening IPRs protection could help these countries to promote their 
economic development.124 However, a number of studies conducted in developing countries 
empirically demonstrates that pharmaceutical and biotechnological patents or trade-secrets 
protection could affect much of the R&D activity which is of an adaptive nature and raise 
imitation or follow-on innovation costs for the use of new technologies, with the bulk of those 
costs being transferred to foreign patent owners as economic rents (profits), and place 
considerable pressures on imitative and innovative enterprises in developing economies causing 
significant drop in the number of inventions.125 For example, the number of global patents 
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originating in the 50 countries identified by the UN as LDCs has dropped from an average 
of 66 per year in the early 1990s to just 10 per year between 2000 and 2004.126 Incidentally, the 
US net surplus of royalties and fees increased from US$14 billion in 1991 to US$22 billion in 
2001, while developing countries suffered a deficit of nearly US$7.5 billion in 1999 alone.127 
So, for innovation based economic development in developing countries, softer regime rather 
than the TRIPS appears to be helpful. The study by Kumar and Saqib supports this statement 
when it finds Indian chemical industry enterprises to be among the more innovative ones in the 
Indian industry. And they attribute this to the weak patent laws viz. absence of product patents 
in India which enabled Indian enterprises to undertake alternative process development.128 In 
another study, Haksar finds that the return to R&D in pharmaceutical industry particularly 
large and explains it to be possible since the development of alternative processes of known 
drugs takes place in absence of patents on pharmaceutical products. 129 
So, it appears that the role of strengthening IPRs as a determinant of innovative activity in 
developing countries is quite weak. In fact, stronger IPRs may actually affect the innovative 
activity adversely by chocking the absorption of knowledge spillovers that are important 
determinants of innovative activity. Mazzoleni and Nelson conduct a survey of theoretical and 
empirical studies and conclude that ‘there is reason for concern that the present movement 
towards stronger patent protection may hinder rather than stimulate technological and 
economic progress.’130 
4.3.  Strengthening IPRs in the TRIPS and Technology Transfer based Economic 
Development 
The TRIPS being included in the WTO’s free trade scheme of market liberalisation urges 
members to benefit out of trade in IPRs goods. It asks members especially IPRs-using 
developing countries to strengthen IPRs with the aim to incentivising developed countries’ 
investments in IPRs goods. In return, the Agreement calls upon innovating developed countries 
to transfer their technology either through FDI, trade or licensing to developing country users 
for reaching production, raising product quality or adaptation to local circumstances leading to 
fulfilment of consumption needs and economic goals.131 Such strengthening of IPRs-led 
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technology transfer appears as economy enhancing not only for developing countries acting 
as a source of total factor productivity improvement and contributing to growth but also for 
innovative countries increasing the technology trade or licensing in goods, brand and brand 
names.  
To benefit mutually out of trade in IPRs goods, the TRIPS makes explicit the signatories’ 
intention to promote economic development as part of the general objectives of the Agreement 
by strengthening IPRs and facilitating technology transfer. For example, Article 7 includes a 
corresponding reference: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge 
and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
In addition, depicting patent rights, Article 28.2 of the Agreement provides for a mechanism 
for rights holders to transfer their property for use by others: ‘Patent owners shall also have the 
right to assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts.’ 
The Agreement also includes provisions preventing abuses that would limit technology transfer. 
For example, Article 8.2 states the principle that: 
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect 
the international transfer of technology. 
Article 40 sticks on control of anti-competitive practices in contractual licences, specifying the 
approach to dealing with this issue, beginning with the following point of understanding: 
Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual 
property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may 
impede the transfer and dissemination of technology. 
Article 66.2 incentivises technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs: 
Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in 
their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to 
least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base. 
For the implementation of Article 66.2, ministers issued a decision at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha in November 2001: 
Reaffirming that the provisions of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement are mandatory, 
it is agreed that the TRIPS Council shall put in place a mechanism for ensuring the 
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monitoring and full implementation of the obligations in question. To this end, 
developed-country members shall submit prior to the end of 2002 detailed reports on 
the functioning in practice of the incentives provided to their enterprises for the 
transfer of technology in pursuance of their commitments under Article 66.2. These 
submissions shall be subject to a review in the TRIPS Council and information shall be 
updated by Members annually.132 
Furthermore, in its Decision of 19 February 2003, the TRIPS Council puts in place the 
reporting mechanism asking developed countries to submit annual reports on their actions in 
relation to Article 66.2.133 However, a review of such annual reports at the October 2006 
meeting of the TRIPS Council finds continuing divergence between some developed and 
developing countries in the interpretation of Article 66.2. The minutes from this meeting and 
other Council documents highlight differences with respect to the definition of technology 
transfer, the ability to measure technology transfer and the role of both developed and 
developing countries under the Agreement, among other issues.134 For example, whether 
technical assistance related to implementation of the TRIPS Agreement can be considered as 
contributing to satisfaction of Article 66.2 gives rise to a debate.135 
Another significant step was taken at the 2007 G8 summit, at which the ‘Heiligendamm 
Process’ was agreed with the launching ‘a new form of co-operation’.136 It aims ‘to achieve 
tangible results within two years’.137 The summit included a dialogue between the G8 and the 
so-called ‘Outreach 5’ (or ‘O5’) countries, namely Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South 
Africa. According to the programme of the Summit: 
The planned topics for the Heiligendamm Process are also to be ‘‘innovation’’ and 
‘‘technology co-operations’’. The G8 countries are to share their know-how with the 
emerging economies especially when it comes to energy efficiency. At the same time, 
agreement is to be reached on more effective international property rights: protection 
against replicated machines, copied brand products and counterfeit medications.138 
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In addition to the general objective of promoting innovation and the transfer and 
dissemination of new technology referred to earlier (Article 7), the TRIPS also contains some 
specific requirements for developed country members to provide incentives for technology 
transfer to least developed countries. For example, the disclosure requirement of a patent 
application (that is, that applicants disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art) is one of them. This 
provision helps for the transfer of and access to technology by providing information readily 
about from whom the technology can be obtained for the duration of the patent term or the 
information when the disclosed invention falls into the public domain and is freely available to 
all at the patent expiry or by enabling the experimental use of an invention in the name of 
‘limited exceptions’ to the patent rights under Article 30.139 
The TRIPS Agreement also allows for cases where, if technology (whether patented or not) is in 
the control of a government, that government is free to transfer the technology on concessional 
terms if it so wishes. Similarly, there is nothing in the TRIPS, which would prevent a 
government or international financial institution from providing financial assistance to permit 
the voluntary transfer of privately-held proprietary technology on concessional terms.140 
Such initiatives to transfer technology within the strengthened IPRs framework of the TRIPS is 
likely to promote economic development for developed countries with ensured rents and 
facilitating technology transfer to help developing countries for follow-on innovations making 
economic progress to them through domestic consumption and exports. However, evidence 
also shows that technology transfer can have a significant impact on economic growth leading 
to economic development once a country has reached a certain level of development, as 
measured by initial GDP per capita.141 For this Thompson and Rushing employ threshold 
regression techniques finding a threshold at an initial level of GDP of US$3,400.142 For 
countries below this value, Falvey and foster find no significant relationship between IPRs-based 
technology transfer and growth, but above, the relationship is positive and significant.143  
To resolve such dilemma, developing countries have made proposals at the WTO and WIPO 
citing issues in relation to their economic development in the TRIPS context. Forums like 
Quake United Nations Office, the South Centre, ICTSD and UNCTAD have in help with very 
useful and high quality documentation in support of developing countries. Two important 
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proposals came to draft an Access to Knowledge (A2K) Treaty144 and for WIPO by 
establishing a Development Agenda145 to address the development-related interests of 
developing countries. Such proposals covered technical cooperation, transfer of technology and 
other issues. With regard to WIPO’s mandate, it is noted that as a UN agency WIPO should be 
guided by the UN’s development goals including the MDGs. 146  
However, it is true that for countries below the minimum development level, informal 
technology transfer is the only alternative means of achieving economic development in 
developing and least developed countries and even in some NICs as well. With stopping this, 
the TRIPS re-regulated technology transfer provision appears as a technology blockade to 
developing and least developed countries like Bangladesh which have the comparative 
advantage in imitation and adaptation of foreign technologies.147 In effect, adding value to and 
improvements of the existing technological base is likely to be impeded in LDCs after the 
TRIPS compliance.148  
5. TRIPS in Agriculture and Economic Development: Implications and 
Challenges 
5.1. Theoretical Background 
As part of IPRs standard-setting, the TRIPS speaks of the international IPRs regime governing 
plant genetic resources (PGRs). It includes a sui generis provision for the protection of IPRs 
associated with agriculture, commonly known as plant varieties protection (PVP). This 
provision appears to balance the interests of variety of actors involved in agricultural trade. For 
instance, PVP encourages investments in agricultural innovations especially plant breeding even 
by domestic companies although only in a limited group of major crops, namely, soybean, corn, 
wheat, and cotton.149 It also helps agriculture-prone LDCs like Bangladesh building up 
agricultural economy through or transfer/trade of agricultural technology especially seeds.150 
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As part of building up agricultural economy, this regime enriched with the new protection 
arrangements in the name of PVP is found to encourage seed trade to promote the seed 
industry, boost exports, protect seed quality, and contributes in general to promote economic 
development in agriculture-prone least developed countries like Bangladesh with better yields in 
a small piece of agricultural land compared to the dense population.151 This regime is also 
found to help public research institutes with the better ability to protect their innovations 
especially new varieties or biotechnology, and ultimately to benefit from licensing and royalty 
revenues.152 However, such agricultural economy invigorating element of the TRIPS is not free 
from shortcomings. For example, PVP which is similar to patents acts as a means of creating 
genetic use restriction technologies which do not help seeds reproducing.153 This causes an 
agriculture-prone LDC like Bangladesh to have extra economic burdens on farmers. Such role 
of PVP appears as contradictory to economic benefit approach of the WTO’s trade 
liberalisation and lends support to general scepticism about the role of IPRs in economic 
development.154 
5.2. Strengthening IPRs in Agriculture and Innovation-based Economic Development  
In agricultural innovation based economic development and for achieving food security, R&D 
in PGRs and biotechnology is a sine qua non.155 To this end, the TRIPS comes up in help for 
incentivising investments in biotechnology with a major contribution in the post-WTO 
scenario. Some empirical research substantiates this assertion when it shows that stronger IPRs 
in agriculture help enhancing research and development efforts in PGRs and biotechnology, 
and greatly boosting up the potential utility areas especially economic interests of the world’s 
genetic resources.156 On such counts, IPRs primarily in the forms of patents and PVP appear to 
provide the exclusivity needed to earn returns to invention and innovation. For instance, the 
US biotechnology industry with patents in place generates a yearly income of US$13 billion.157 
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The research also shows that the potential utility of IPRs helps encouraging the use of 
biotechnology to generate high yielding varieties leading to increase the incomes of small 
farmers and consumers.158 For example, utility patents in agriculture technology brought 
economic development in Philippines with high yielding and exports.159 However, the absence 
of some form of market exclusivity of agricultural investments through IPRs causes 
biotechnologies face an appropriation problem because of their inherent natural qualities that 
make imitation by others feasible at relatively low costs. Innovative plant varieties, as embodied 
in seeds also readily reproduce in identical qualities simply by virtue of cultivating the plants.160 
Furthermore, new plant varieties face competing production and sales simply at the time they 
are brought in the market as an act that carries an inferred licence for replication and 
production without enumerated rights.161 
However, since the TRIPS recognises a trivial modification of existing PGRs as an invention, 
this results in an increasing number of patents, as well as the breadth of the claims which create 
a situation where companies conducting further research often find it difficult not to infringe 
the patent rights of other companies.162 Lindner describes the variety and scope of claims made 
in the ‘basic processes and inventions’ as posing a danger of a patent gridlock for developing 
countries where it is virtually impossible to develop new transgenic plants without infringing 
one or other of these patents.163 For example, there appears a patent gridlock in the case of Bt 
technology and gives rise to several hundred overlapping patent rights for it. For infringement 
of its patent rights for Bt technology, recently Syngenta filed two lawsuits against some of its 
competitors.164 In a bid to get rid of such danger of a patent gridlock and to create more 
freedom for research, a new trend of mergers and acquisitions has arisen in the global food, 
agrochemical and seed business, leading to significant concentration of the industry. However, 
as a part of global mergers and acquisitions, patents in the agricultural sector are now 
concentrated in the hands of just a few large MNCs including Monsanto, Dupont, Syngenta, 
Dow, and Bayer. Such mergers and acquisitions create more monopoly causing price rise in 
agriculture technology. 
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In addition, as part of IPRs standard-setting in agriculture, the TRIPS simplifies the 
agricultural innovation process by facilitating intense interaction and feedback among the 
different parts of the system: individual research institutes, universities and industry, the 
scientific community and farmers, the traditional agricultural research community and 
biotechnologists, the public and private sectors. Industrialised countries, most notably in the 
US, have availed of such opportunities and made economic development through agriculture. 
However, in many developing countries, the linkages among the different parts of the system 
are weak. This is likely to inhibit, rather than facilitate, transfers of technology, innovation and 
economic development.165 
5.3. Strengthening IPRs in Agriculture and Technology Transfer-based Economic 
Development  
The TRIPS technology provisions contribute to the growth of agriculture with new 
developments in trading arrangements by improving the ability of private breeders to control 
local seed markets, and preventing unauthorized trade in protected varieties, by increasing 
access to privately developed foreign seed varieties on making their developers more willing to 
market their products there, and by retaining farmers’ privileges, or the right of farmers to keep 
sufficient seeds from the harvest for replanting.166 However, for transition economies, such 
provisions become matters of concern in technology transfer for its role of ‘shutting out’ rather 
than ‘crowding in’.167 This is because member countries are required to have legal arrangements 
for the protection of newly developed varieties.168 With this caveat of the TRIPS, it is clear that 
agricultural technologies that were available in developing countries in an unrestricted manner 
will no longer be freely available. In this respect, it is to be noted that with the free use of 
technologies farmers had rights to produce, save, and use the varieties, and brought in once the 
Green Revolution.169 So, it appears that for fulfilling welfare needs by achieving food security in 
developing countries, technology plays a major role, given the impressive record of technology 
in enhancing food grain production during the past half century. And now it has been argued 
that the challenge of food security cannot easily be met unless transfer of biotechnology is 
promoted.170 To this end, the TRIPS inserts provisions on technology transfer as well.  
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However, agricultural technology is not likely to be available in an unrestricted manner as it 
was before due to the protectionist approach of the TRIPS.171 This is because, with the creation 
of the TRIPS in the WTO, there arise problems in technology transfer since the technology 
owning MNCs regulate technology transfer with their profiteering interests, not serving the 
interests of local farmers. In addition, MNCs do not generally grant commercialisation licences 
to third parties and choose to retain the sole right to use the protected technology for 
commercial development. However, if the MNCs do permit commercialisation licences, rights 
holders seek unreasonable or unacceptable terms. As a result, it is not only subsistence farmers 
who are at risk but licence holders also suffer in marketing. Indeed, in countries with very little 
internal breeding capacity, the entry of MNCs active in this field as noted by International 
Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) is unlikely to foster directly the development of 
domestic industrial capacity.172 It is thus unlikely that domestic breeding industries would 
substantially benefit from the introduction of monopoly rights rather this poses a threat for 
food security in developing and least developed countries.173 For example, with the TRIPS into 
effect in India, trade in seeds get into the hands of MNCs and as a result, the country can not 
utilise its substantial capabilities of making its own GMOs freely accessing MNCs-owned 
technology holding profiteering interests, not feeding the poor people.174 
5.4. Technology Transfer Mechanisms in Agriculture  
Little research has yet been done on transfer of technology related to agriculture specifically 
seeds, mechanisation, irrigation, and the application of chemical fertilizers and herbicides. The 
quantitative information regarding either the forms of genetic technology acquisition by 
developing countries or the different forms of technology transfer between OECD Member and 
developing countries is also little. This is because the relative importance of one form of 
technology transfer compared to another would, clearly, vary from country to country, in 
accordance with the state of development of their agriculture sector and as a function of 
effective demand for technology. However, in accordance with some common practice, genetic 
technologies appears to be transferred through the purchase of an end product (as seeds or 
machinery), or as an input into the agricultural research process (for example, a patented 
genetic mapping technique, or a patented gene). The transfer may occur in many different 
forms, in a commercial or market context, in a non-market or ‘public good’ context, or by a 
combination of market and non-market mechanisms. And, in technology transfer transactions 
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between developed and developing countries, several different public and private partners 
may be involved. These may include national governments or government departments, NGOs 
and non-profit private foundations like the International Agricultural Research Council 
(IARCs).175 
With respect to genetic technology as products, the most common form of transfer is probably 
the purchase or import of seeds, principally for cereal and forage crops, fruit and vegetables, 
and planting material for floriculture products. This would apply where countries have an 
important commercial farming sector, where a large share of planted area is sown to hybrids, 
where countries are major exporters of particular kinds of agricultural products or where 
countries have a dualistic system of production (large-scale commercial farming and low-income 
smallholders). While some small-scale farmers purchase seeds and are engaged in profitable 
production, among low-income, low-input farmers, the major form of technology transfer 
remains that of the informal exchange of seeds which are saved on farm.176 
Another form of agricultural technology transfer is joint ventures i.e. joint ventures between 
companies from developed and developing countries for the development of genetic 
technologies. However, little published data is available on joint ventures. The recent 50-50 
joint venture between the Plant Genetic Systems (since taken over by AgrEvo GmbH of 
Germany) and the Indian company ProAgro, set up to develop genetically modified oilseed rape 
and other products is one example. A number of joint ventures in seeds production and plant 
breeding are also being formed, particularly for the production and marketing of hybrid 
crops.177 
For research purposes, the transfer or exchange of inbred or parental lines in respect to genetic 
materials especially seeds is also common in OECD Member countries. This form of transfer 
takes place usually under a trade secret arrangement. However, such transfer to a developing 
country depends on whether hybrids are involved and/or whether the receiving country has 
already introduced PBRs.178 
For research purposes, MTAs are also used extensively to transfer genetic material. MTAs are 
commonly used in the framework of collaborative research, particularly in publicly or donor 
funded research projects and programmes, where universities and/or public research 
institutions are partners. It is also the favoured form of technology transfer among and by the 
IARCs which, inter alia, are the designated custodians of the world’s plant genetic resources. 
 





Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#2 
33
IARCs agreements typically require that no IPRs are sought, but do not include payment 
requirements.179 
Furthermore, public/private sector partnerships for bio-prospecting work as a mode of 
agricultural technology transfer. Such initiatives are growing in countries rich in biodiversity 
which wish, at one and the same time, to maintain control and ownership over their genetic 
resources and to earn revenue to be reinvested in research on their identification, classification 
and preservation. For example, Costa Rica has negotiated a number of agreements for 
exploration of their genetic resources. In such agreements IPRs are negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis and it is also ensured that any profits from inventions and materials protected by IPRs or 
from products derived from those protected inventions and materials are shared by the various 
partners in such a way as to ensure further exploration and conservation in Costa Rica.180 
For an LDC perspective, technology donation is another form of agricultural technology 
transfer. Sometimes technology is donated to a developing country and usually to a public 
research organisation or government to be used under certain conditions. For example, a 
technology donation agreement is signed between the International Service for the Acquisition 
of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), Monsanto and the Centre of Research and Advanced 
Studies (CINVESTAV) in Mexico. It involves the transfer of Monsanto patented gene 
technology for virus resistance in potatoes to a public Mexican research institute. There is 
another example of donation where an agreement between Ciba-Geigy (now Novartis) and the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, which is one of the IARCs is 
signed. It relates to the transfer of a synthetic Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) gene for insect 
resistance, patented by Ciba-Geigy, for use in transgenic rice research at IRRI. In both cases, the 
transfer was made as a royalty-free licence.181 
6. TRIPS in Pharmaceuticals and Economic Development:  
Implications and Challenges  
6.1. Legal Background 
As part of TRIPS standard-setting of IPRs in pharmaceuticals, the TRIPS members are urged to 
introduce patents in pharmaceuticals. This standard-setting of IPRs in pharmaceuticals brings 
in the security of huge investments made in pharmaceutical innovations especially drugs and 
active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), and entitles countries with levies, taxes and royalties 
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licensing or exporting.182 However, for countries like Bangladesh that do not have 
mentionable R&D in pharmaceuticals, such standard-setting is of no use but to secure 
developed countries’ economic interests.183 Nevertheless, the standard-setting in 
pharmaceuticals qualifies exception clauses like differential treatment in transition period, 
compulsory licensing, and parallel importation keeping in mind the prevention of anti-
competitive practices of innovators and responding to emergencies. For Bangladesh, these 
exception clauses come in help for reverse-engineering pharmaceuticals, which qualifies one 
kind of innovations on accessing the transferred technologies and supplying them in the 
domestic and export market.184 Such limited opportune in pharmaceutical innovation and 
technology transfer turns up with economic benefits to the country although there arises 
controversy recently as regards attempts by developed countries to block the exports of cheap 
HIV/AIDS drugs by some developing countries including China, India, Thailand and Brazil.185 
6.2. TRIPS Strengthening of IPRs in Pharmaceuticals and  
Innovation-based Economic Development 
Strengthening of IPRs in pharmaceuticals meaning the introduction of patents serves as an 
important incentive for pharmaceutical innovation since patents secure unambiguously the 
investments in innovation and turn into an economy stimulating tool by being recognised as 
key instruments for privately appropriating the economic benefits of innovation.186 And patents 
extract the economic benefits of pharmaceutical innovation by simplifying the innovation 
system with minor modification (for example, in terms of dosage) of existing products 
qualifying as inventions resulting in more products and revenues, and by squeezing free-riding 
or streamlining IPRs flexibilities of compulsory licensing ensuring the maximum returns of 
innovating costs.187 In fact, streamlining of IPRs secures investments in R&D of a drug 
formulation that costs about US$800 million.188 And with the help of reconfigured definition 
of invention, global brand name pharmaceutical corporations rebrand their products, get 
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patents on them (commonly known as patents for second use or evergreening) and seek to 
restrict the ability of generic manufacturers to produce and distribute essential medicines 
through patents or data exclusivity agreements. Such strengthening of IPRs causes significant 
impact on the innovative capabilities of pharmaceutical industries leading to economic 
development in developed countries but not in developing and least developed countries 
lagging behind the technological frontier and with low per capita income because broad patents 
on basic inventions might hinder further innovation, especially if licenses are given on exclusive 
terms or at very high prices which such countries cannot afford.189 For example, almost all the 
empirical studies on the Indian case agree that patents in pharmaceuticals (1911 to 1970) did 
not help India move forward due to affordability of technology but a weaker intellectual 
protection system (from 1970 to 2005) encouraged the development of indigenous 
technological capabilities and catching-up.190 
In addition to demoralising pure innovation based development, the TRIPS extension of 
intellectual property to essential medicines and the reconfiguration of the ‘patentable 
invention’ definition revolve around the rights to issue compulsory licenses, and to 
manufacture and export generic versions of patented and brand name drugs which come out as 
qualified pharmaceutical innovations.191 However, because of the revolving, users based in poor 
countries, who rely on manufacture and export generic versions of patented and brand name 
drugs for meeting up health and developmental needs are put in a vicious shackle of MNCs’ 
profiteering interests. To get out of the shackle, African countries in the grip of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and countries like Brazil, India, and other developing and least developed countries 
and their NGO advocates seek to clarify interpretations of the TRIPS that permit compulsory 
licensing, parallel importing, generic manufacture and export. In response, there came the 
Doha Declaration supplemented by the waiver decision of 2005, which is due to be 
incorporated in the TRIPS as an amended Article 31bis upon ratification by two-thirds of the 
WTO members allows countries producing generics of patented drugs under compulsory 
licensing and supplying them home or to countries affected with HIV/AIDS.192 
In effect, such initiatives enable some LDCs trying to develop their own capability to produce 
pharmaceutical products. However, due to the market size in some countries and lack of 
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technical persons and technology in some, it does not appear to be feasible to set up plants in 
many of these LDCs. Such a picture is depicted in a recent survey conducted by the Business 
Monitor International (BMI). It reports that sixteen out of fifty LDCs,193 have no 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities, and other thirty three countries have very limited or 
insufficient manufacturing capabilities. However, compared to all LDCs, only Bangladesh has 
strong pharmaceutical manufacturing base, and with this infrastructure, it is broadly authorised 
to produce three types of pharmaceutical products. These are (a) products under compulsory 
license, (b) over-the-counter (OTC) drugs commonly known as brand name generics, and (c) 
products under licensing agreement from an original manufacturer. Except for the first type of 
drugs, there is no restriction to export the products to anywhere in the world. For the first 
category of drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers of Bangladesh can legally copy patented 
pharmaceutical products since it is exempted from patenting in pharmaceuticals till the end of 
2015.194  
And after the TRIPS compliance, the Doha Declaration supplemented by the waiver decision 
hold economic benefits prospects. On using such opportunities, Bangladesh tends to produce a 
number of generics of patented and off-patent drugs and supplies them competitively at home 
and abroad at cheaper prices.195 In that sense, Bangladesh is fortunately in the privileged 
position today to capitalize the post-2005 opportunities till 31 December 2015 in selling 
generics of patented drugs in its domestic market and exporting them as well to other LDCs 
and non-members of the WTO.196 Analysts think if Bangladesh can avail itself of the 
opportunity, it could export up to TK100 billion worth of drugs annually.’197 Keeping this in 
mind, the BMI’s Industry Survey and Forecasts Series titled ‘Bangladesh Pharmaceuticals and 
Healthcare Report Q 3 2008’ describes Bangladesh as one of Asia Pacific’s most promising drug 
makers.198 
For producing various types of drugs, there are about 250 local pharmaceutical companies 
registered in the country. Out of this some 150 companies including 4 multinational 
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companies are actively engaged in producing quality medicines.199 On finding their operation 
less profitable due to the Drug (Control) Ordinance 1982 which favours local pharmaceutical 
companies, most multinational pharmaceutical companies have actually either left or sold out 
their interests in Bangladesh (i.e. Organon). Amongst 150 companies, only 20 companies like 
ACI, Beximco, Square and some other leading local pharmaceutical industries are certified by 
ISO 9000 for their unique quality systems with state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities and are 
enjoying a market share of more than 80 per cent while the multi-nationals are holding 20 per 
cent.200 With its very strong finished formulation-manufacturing base, Bangladesh exploits all 
the advantages for its strategic location in the South Asian pharmaceutical region and among 
the LDCs, and remains on top with 97 percent of total pharmaceutical production in LDCs 
and is growing up with 50 percent annually. Currently the entire pharmaceutical manufacture 
in the country holds an annual turnover of about US$500 million, and is exported to over 70 
countries.201 In a bid to boost its export further, the Government declares ‘Pharmaceuticals’ as 
the product of the year in 2008. Such a move is the first in the country and pharmaceuticals has 
been singled out considering its tremendous prospect in the global market and diversification 
of export basket as well.202 For such initiatives and export outcomes, a World Bank report 
prepared on Bangladesh shows the export potential in pharmaceuticals more likely to be up for 
some years to come. However, its per capita expenditure on medicine which is only about US$4 
per year compared to the per capita GDP of US$450 with the growth rate at over 6 percent a 
year poses health concerns since this is one of the lowest not only in the world but also in the 
subcontinent.203 
Nevertheless, to prove its efficiency as drug manufacturer, Bangladesh began small-scale export 
of drugs and medicines back in the late 80s. Only two local manufacturers, namely, Beximco 
and Square pharmaceuticals took initiatives on their own to export pharmaceutical products to 
some less-regulated overseas markets like neighbouring Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka in the 
absence of any official support and incentives. In the early 90s, a few more companies joined 
the race and Bangladesh could make inroads in some of the partially regulated markets, 
including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Singapore.204 In the year 2003-2004, Bangladesh 
exported pharmaceutical products worth of TK556 million that has increased from TK367 
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million in the year 2002-2003.205 Towards the European Union, in the year 2003-2004, 
Bangladesh exported pharmaceutical products worth of TK14 million to France and TK13 
million worth of to Germany.206 Pharmaceutical export rose to US$17.64 million in the first 
five months of FY07-08 while it was US$11.86 million during the same period of FY06-07. To 
have more access in highly regulated markets like the EU and the US, Bangladeshi 
pharmaceutical products have to pass through highly restrictive regulatory regime and require 
stern certifications.207 To this end, existing big pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh have 
commenced manufacturing in world class plants as MDI (Metered Dose Inhaler) plant and are 
going for certification in the regulated markets. Recently the Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited, 
one of the leading pharmaceutical companies in Bangladesh, has invested US$50 million on a 
new plant conforming to the US FDA (Food and Drug Administration) standards. 208  
The success in entering highly regulated markets is viewed as a major breakthrough for the 
Bangladesh pharmaceutical industry. For such success, there are many factors to credit with. 
Along with successful technology diffusion tools, the multidisciplinary professional education 
of the pharmacists ensured the quality of pharmaceutical products.209 In other developments as 
recent findings suggest the pharmaceutical industry in Bangladesh is actively involved in the 
production of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs). At present, 21 different companies 
manufacture locally 41 such products comprising only 20 percent and the rest are mostly 
imported from China and India.210 Along side that, auxiliary or linkage industries (packaging, 
paper, plastic, bottles, caps, tubes, and ampoules, printing etc.) are also developed.211 However, 
as this has been well below the full potentials of the country for meeting domestic needs and 
exports, the government has approved the establishment of an API industrial park at an 
estimated cost of US$30bn on 300 acres of land in Munshigonj. The World Bank mission has 
agreed to provide necessary funds only after the completion of a study on social and 
environmental aspects of the project. Another development partner, the United Kingdom 
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Department for International Development (DFID) has agreed in principle to conduct the 
study. 212 
In order to set up the proposed park, Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation 
(BSCIC) has been assigned. The project is expected to be completed by 2011. The Corporation 
will develop the infrastructure with state-of-the-art facilities including a central effluent 
treatment plant (ETP) and incinerator for solid and liquid wastes management. After 
completion of infrastructure development, a total of 40 industrial plots will be allocated to 
individual companies for setting up API plants. The park will be operated through a public-
private partnership. 
At the API Park, a total of 30 drug companies have already applied for plots. They have the 
money ready to establish plants. The companies will start producing APIs within six months 
after the government hands over the plots to them. It is really impossible to be competitive in 
the international medicine market if a company doesn't produce its own raw materials. 
Bangladeshi companies need to invest in a big way in API Park if they want to have a big slice of 
the export pie. 213 
The park is expected to turn the drug industry a major export earner and improve the country’s 
economy immensely. However, this depends on the quick set up of the park since Bangladesh is 
now enjoying a special benefit to export drugs to all over the world under the TRIPS waiver 
deal which allows LDCs to export patent-free drugs to anywhere in the world between 2006 and 
2016. In addition, it is estimated that country can save at least 70 per cent of the import 
amount of TK15 billion as spent in 2009 by producing raw materials at the API Park and API 
products worth US$750 million per annum could be exported over the next five years.214 
6.3. TRIPS strengthening of IPRs in Pharmaceuticals and  
Technology Transfer-based Economic Development 
Since pharmaceutical R&D is very expensive and needs large markets to recoup the 
investments, pharmaceutical companies like to transfer technologies to different markets. To 
this end, pharmaceutical companies press for well-defined IPRs in countries contributing to the 
development of markets for technologies and to the commercialization of inventions. The large 
markets in developing and least developed countries initially attract pharmaceutical MNCs to 
capitalise their intentions but to secure huge investments they insist on IPRs, in transfer of 
technology through FDI and possibly related R&D, licensing or joint venture agreements, 
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manufacture and market pharmaceuticals products, and make economic development. To 
such ends, IPRs come in help. They provide a legal basis for negotiating contractual 
arrangements that transfer technological information among firms and across borders. They 
also facilitate market transactions and often act as the legal foundation around which strategic 
investment decisions, especially about technology transfer, are made.215 However, the survey 
researches of Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi,216 Lee and Mansfield,217 and Maskus218 
made it clear that pharmaceutical MNCs generally seek to avoid the transfer of strategically 
sensitive technology of pharmaceutical ones to unaffiliated parties, regardless of the perceived 
strength of the IPRs regime.  
6.4. Technology Transfer Mechanisms in Pharmaceuticals   
It is established that for strategic technology transfer decisions in pharmaceuticals, MNCs often 
depend on ownership, location and internalization (OLI) conditions. Since they possess 
ownership, the further conditions of location and internalization must be met for them to 
transfer technologies overseas.219 Location advantages are essential to make the business more 
profitable in the foreign country in terms of minimum transportation costs and tariffs, low 
input prices, access to distribution networks and local regulatory and enforcement 
environments. The MNCs interpret the protection of IPRs in the host country as a location 
advantage, as IPRs are territorial in nature, and hence differ across national boundaries.220 In 
addition, internalization of production appears to be more profitable for firms rather than to 
sell or license their IPRs to independent local firms in the foreign country.221 Such advantages 
take the form of avoiding transaction costs with potential licensees, controlling inputs and 
protecting quality.222 Different levels of protection in national IPRs regimes may influence 
where an MNC decides to locate its business or to internalize or externalize its intellectual 
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assets.223 The OLI framework and the arguments put forward, thus, suggest that IPRs 
protection is one of many factors influencing firms’ decisions to transfer technologies to a 
particular country. However, the effects of strengthened IPRs protection are often dependent 
on its interrelationship with the effects of other factors, such as the size of the domestic market, 
the structure of factor supply, productive infrastructure and the degree of stability of the 
macroeconomic environment.224  
In view of the OLI construction and significant IPRs protection framework, Bangladesh 
qualifies as a pharmaceutical technology transferee. This is because it is more attractive as a 
location to transfer pharmaceutical technologies through investment, licensing or outsourcing 
for its having bigger local market than most of the LDCs and in terms of geographical location. 
In addition, Bangladesh has the potential to manufacture cheaper medicines out of accessed 
technologies and exports them all over the world. To qualify as a transferee, Bangladesh does 
already have reliance on the TRIPS transition period and the waiver decision, and starts 
exporting medicines to a country who is a developing country or least developing country 
Member of the WTO and has not yet enacted the patent protection law or to a country who is a 
Member of the WTO and provides patent protection but has granted compulsory licenses for 
the import of medicines, or to a country who is not the member of the WTO.225 Another big 
advantage for Bangladesh is gaining the markets, where India and Brazil used to sell until 2005, 
because these countries are now precluded from supplying medicines subject to patents, thereby 
strengthening the competitive positions of Bangladeshi producers of medicines.226 In addition, 
almost in all such cases, medicines are reverse-engineered out of technologies transferred here 
informally availing of the TRIPS transition period or of off-patent technologies. And, it is 
interesting to note that the existing Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (Patents and Designs Act) 227 
framed during the British colonial rule does not recognise the TRIPS transition opportunities 
of informal technology transfer for domestic consumption needs and exports.228 
To utilize such markets after the TRIPS compliance depends on formal modes of technology 
transfer. However, in Bangladesh, a small amount of formal technology transfer in 
pharmaceuticals takes place through licensing, FDI and joint venture.229 To have more 
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technology transfer, Bangladesh has lately signed bilateral investment treaties with the EU 
and the US containing technology transfer provisions.230 Such treaties require Bangladesh to 
broaden definition of IPRs. In addition, it has currently been under pressure to resume the 
pending talks with the US on reaching a deal named the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (TIFA).231 The proposed Agreement contains a technology dealing asking 
Bangladesh to insert TRIPS-plus provisions on patentability in its legislations and limiting the 
TRIPS transition period as pre-conditions for technology transfer.232 Such agreements provide 
for the transfer of know-how in manufacturing to managerial practices. These explicit transfers 
are negotiated in addition to implicit transfers that occurr simply through the introduction of 
foreign personnel and techniques. This type of transfer has the effect of shifting the productive 
frontier of an economy and improving short-term economic performance. So, any resultant 
technological progress is expected to be crucial to the long-run growth process.233 However, such 
US and EU initiatives are likely to block the change or flexibility in the compulsory licenses 
clause through TRIPs-plus agreements affecting the availability of essential drugs at reasonable 
price within the domestic market of Bangladesh and other Third World and developing 
countries.234 
In addition to the OLI formulation of technology transfer, technology transfer also takes place 
in an LDC like Bangladesh through outsourcing or patent disclosure. To put such means 
through, many of the firms in India and China who are champion reverse engineers are 
recently interested to outsource their production in Bangladesh as a potential manufacturer of 
generic versions of patented products which they cannot produce in their own country after 
2005.235 Furthermore, although the Patents and Designs Act 1911 does not endorse 
outsourcing as a means of transfer of technology, it recognises disclosure of patent details.236 
Such disclosure helps for early generics approval serving in local and international markets. 
However, this does not happen to all patent applications stored in the mail box set up in 
 
230 See European Union-Bangladesh Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development 1999, signed 22 May 2000, 
LEX-FAOC036142 <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-36142.pdf> 2 April 2008; United States-Bangladesh Bilateral 
Investment Treaty 1986 signed 12 March 1986; entered into force 25 July 1989 Treaty Doc.99-23 Congress; see also 
E Mansfield, ‘Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer’ (Discussion 
Paper Number 19, International Finance Corporation, World Bank, Washington, DC 1994). 
231 ‘Bangladesh to Resume TIFA Negotiation Talks with US, The New Nation, 3 February 09. 
232 Mamun Rashid, ‘Transit, TIFA and Bangladesh’ The Daily Star, Monday, July 20, 2009.  
233 See Linda Y Yueh, ‘Global Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth’ (2007) 5(3) Northwestern Journal 
of Technology and Intellectual Property 436. 
234 Prosenjit Chakraborty, Syded Ferhat Anwar and Mahjabeen Ahmad, ‘Strategies under the WTO Regime: The 
Pharmaceutical Sector in Bangladesh’ (2003) 5(2) Journal of Bangladesh Studies 42, 44-46. 
235 Srividhya Ragavan and Jamie Mayer O'shields, ‘Has India Addressed Its Farmers’ Woes? A Story of Plant 
Protection Issues’ (2007) 20 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 97. 
236 Ibid. 
 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#2 
43
accordance with the executive order requiring the Department of Patents, Designs and 
Trademarks (DPDT) since it asks for data exclusivity.237 
7. Strategies to Be Framed 
7.1. Points of Departure 
For both of its costs and benefits, the TRIPS Agreement is neither inherently good nor bad for 
economic development in an LDC like Bangladesh, as current discussions seem to suggest. 
However, the opportunity for economic benefits which accrue through technology acquisition, 
follow-on innovations and their uses can not be achieved without adopting all out strategies. 
The strategic policy framework requires being such that supports trade liberalization, 
establishing incentives to attract FDI, and strengthening of IPRs. Such policy framework may be 
contained to reform their IPRs regime to maximize economic gains, while limiting the 
potentially adverse effects of improved protection and to facilitate access of local entrepreneurs 
to the IPR system as has been done in India, Thailand, and South Korea. It is also to be noted 
that the developed and those developing countries that have achieved substantial growth rates 
have all fine-tuned their IPRs system to match their development needs, rather than blindly 
implementing a comprehensive IPRs policy.238 So, the TRIPS Agreement appears to hold 
economic development prospects for Bangladesh if the existing IPRs regime gets fine-tuned 
upon a policy that establishes a balance between intellectual property protection and welfare 
needs at the national and international levels. To have the balance, the TRIPS needs to be 
neutralised in the local legislations by minimising imitation or follow-on innovation costs raised 
by pharmaceutical and biotechnological patents or trade-secrets protection or by expediting the 
pace of technological development by spreading the flow of R&D spillovers that are important 
inputs in research. 
Since the TRIPS Agreement of the WTO is a reality, which least developed countries like 
Bangladesh have to exist with, ways and means related to the TRIPS prior to 2016 and post 
2016 require to be considered with the view to harnessing local consumption needs and 
economic welfare goals. This consideration involves national and international strategic trade 
partnership and legal preparations covering use of technology and technology trade in 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals.  
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238 Dolfsma, above n 27. 
 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#2 
44
7.1.  Issues for National Action to Moderate the Adverse Effect  
7.1.1.  TRIPS Transitional Period 
As part of forming national strategies covering use of technology and technology trade in 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals, two sets of preparations can be taken in LDCs like 
Bangladesh, namely, strategy for the TRIPS transitional period and strategy for after the TRIPS 
compliance. 
There is historical precedent that modern developed countries often undertook policies that 
would be considered piracy by today’s standards. In practice, the rationale is a proven method 
for advancing technological and economic development, tested frequently and successfully by 
many of today’s developed countries during their history. Developing countries that have weak 
IPRs protection are doing nothing more than following historically proven methods for 
advancing development. So, it is rational for most of the least developed countries that have 
little incentive to adopt the TRIPS to obtain IPRs as inexpensively as possible by adopting 
policies that support formal and informal technology transfer and grow their IPRs protection 
level in parallel with economic development and according to their own industrial and 
commercial strengths.239  
Among the policy responses that developing country governments can take at the national level 
in order to promote economic development include exploiting the policy spaces available in the 
TRIPS fully for formal and informal technology transfer and exploit the technologies for follow-
on innovations including petty patents and industrial design patents. Although LDCs can 
continue informal technology transfer meaning piracy in the transition period, it is better to 
bring such informal technology transfer in legal coverage to avoid loosing market access in 
developed countries. And for this, there needs: incorporating the provisions of compulsory 
licensing in the IPR legislation, incorporating the research exception, early working exception 
or ‘Bolar’ provision, allowing parallel imports or grey-market imports, incorporating breeders’ 
exceptions and farmers’ exceptions in sui generis plant variety protection. The experience of 
several East Asian countries suggests that such steps help them in acquiring technology that 
leads to petty patents and industrial design patents, and ultimately prove to be effective means 
of encouraging domestic enterprises to undertake minor adaptive innovations and foster an 
innovation based rivalry among them.  
For this advantage to take into use in Bangladesh, the existing Patents and Designs Act 1911 
needs to incorporate transitional provisions allowing the use of technology and technology 
trade with informal technology access and facilitating exports to countries having no 
infrastructure of reverse engineering and failing to support people with low cost life saving 
medicines or food. However, there arises a question of legality as regards reduction or 
 
239 Ostergard, above n 7, 115-55. 
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withdrawal of the already protection. This is because where least-developed countries do 
provide some kinds of intellectual property protection even though they are not required to do 
so under the TRIPS Agreement, they are obliged not to reduce or withdraw the protection that 
they currently give.240 So, unless and until the TRIPS Council or the WTO panel makes a 
decision on this, it is deemed to be a valid option to adopt informal technology access for a 
least developed country like Bangladesh during the TRIPS transition period and manufacture 
low cost drugs including the HIV/AIDS drugs, agricultural products and others for the uses at 
home or abroad. 
However, for producing and supplying low cost HIV/AIDS drugs, strong lobbying shall have to 
be made with the importing countries and also with the World Health Organization authorities 
who selects the potential suppliers to supply medicines for HIV/AIDS in the African countries. 
In addition, in order to facilitate exports of medicines, the pharmaceutical plants and the 
products must comply with the standards set by the importing countries. In many cases, it 
means that both the products and the plants are approved by the drug administration of the 
importing countries. 
Furthermore, strategies to be made for encouraging countries like China, Brazil, India and 
others to outsource in Bangladesh for producing medicines or APIs on taking its advantage of 
special and differential treatment in terms of the TRIPS compliance. In this connection, it is to 
be noted that the limited outsourcing of low innovation coding or other functions (e.g. 
customer care call centres) tends to evolve to progressively more complex coding tasks and 
higher innovation activities, leading to significant innovations in the recipient (outsourced to) 
country. And this outsourced low innovation becomes a form of technology transfer and serves 
as a stepping stone to higher innovation functions, and eventually to world-class 
competitiveness for some countries.241 For example, through outsourcing by the US and the EU 
among others, China has become a power in technology although at the beginning it had not 
achieved a level of intellectual property protection and enforcement the US and the EU 
considered sufficient.242 For Bangladesh, however, there might arise some issues raised from 
local pharmaceutical companies for competition with foreign companies. In that case 
outsourcing in pharmaceuticals can be restricted only to manufacturing of APIs. 
 
240 Some analysts have questioned the legal validity of this “no roll-back” provision and regard it as being beyond 
the mandate of the WTO Council for TRIPs, for example see S Musungu, ‘A Conceptual Framework for Priority 
Identification and Delivery of IP Technical Assistance for LDCs during the Extended Transition Period under the 
TRIPS Agreement’ (Quaker United Nations Office: Geneva, 2007). 
241 Gervais, above n 5, 384. 
242 Ibid, 389. 
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7.1.2.  After TRIPS Compliance:  
The strategy for after the TRIPS compliance requires taking advantage of flexibilities which 
allow some sort of informal technology transfer and preparing the country to attract formal 
technology transfer in the way of FDI, licensing or joint ventures. However, the costs for 
preparations impose a considerable financial burden on developing countries, particularly 
LDCs like Bangladesh. For example, a World Bank study notes that implementing the TRIPS 
obligations would require the LDCs to invest in buildings, equipment, training and so forth 
that would cost each of them US$150 million for many of the LDCs this represents a full year’s 
development budget.243 The UNCTAD provides some rough estimates of the administrative 
costs of complying with TRIPS in various developing countries.244 For Bangladesh, it anticipates 
one-time costs of administrative TRIPS compliance (drafting legislation) amounting to 
US$250,000 and over US$1.1 million in annual costs for judicial work, equipment, and 
enforcement efforts.245 However, these estimates do not include training costs. Such potential 
costs explain the reluctance of many developing economies to strengthen their regimes.  
As part of preparation by drafting IPRs legislation for agricultural products, the country can 
legislate for a sui generis regime as indicated in Article 27.3 of the TRIPS for protecting local 
plant varieties in addition to the new varieties developed by local and MNCs. This protection 
strategy is likely to attract MNCs with FDI or joint venture in agricultural sector for its being an 
agriculture-prone country or convince MNCs to license their agricultural technologies especially 
biotechnologies to the country. Such technologies which already prove to be helpful in high 
yielding in India, Thailand or the Philippines may benefit hunger-stricken Bangladeshis with 
food and economic means. This regime is also supposed to protect farmers’ traditional rights to 
re-sow and exchange seeds. Such initiative can save local farmers from spending money each 
time they sow seeds and help them fulfilling subsistence needs. With a view to compliment the 
sui generis regime, the country can amend its Seeds Ordinance 1977246 to encourage seed trade 
to promote the seed industry, boost exports, and protect seed quality. Such schemes are 
expected to provide adequate rewards to stimulate successful R&D of plant varieties without 
compromising local needs and would promote breeders exclusively as a means to promote 
agricultural trade since both over-protection and under-protection detrimentally affect trade, 
and discount food security issues.247 
 
243 J M Finger, ‘The WTO’s Special Burden on Less Developed Countries’ (2000) 19(3) Cato Journal 425. 
244 UNCTAD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries (1996)  
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ite1_en.pdf > 10 July 2010. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ordinance No. XXXIII of 1977. Published in the Bangladesh Gazette, Extraordinary, dated the 19th July 1977. 
247 Ragavan and O'shields, above n 235, 97. 
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In addition, the Patents and Designs Act 1911 which is inherited from the colonial times 
provides for protection of all inventions including pharmaceuticals. So, in some respect 
Bangladesh is already in the TRIPS arena but the protection has hardly managed only four 
MNCs subsidiaries to have their operations in Bangladesh. It is also true that because of the 
protection some pharmaceutical enterprises have tried to develop their own technology in 
producing generics of in-patent and off-patent drugs. However, this gain is nothing compared to 
India since the weak IPRs regime started in 1970 could bring in the rapid evolution of Indian 
pharmaceutical industry in building local capabilities and now it stands seven in the world 
ranking with a rising trend of residents in patent ownership in India, and in terms of the ability 
of India to raise her share in the US patents. Not only that, it also accounts for 70 per cent of 
the bulk drugs production and 80 per cent of formulations produced in the country. So, it is 
not IPRs but the technological capabilities of Indian companies and institutions which have 
attracted leading MNCs to open R&D joint ventures, hire contract research and establish 
R&D centres. Ranbaxy, Abbot Laboratories, Parke Davis, and Smith Kline and Beecham, 
among others are the examples of such Indian technology adventures.248 So, in addition to 
strengthening IPRs which is a reality now, Bangladesh should give attention to building local 
capabilities by joint ventures, commissioning contract research and setting up R&D centres as 
India did. 
7.2.  Issues for International Action to Moderate the Adverse Effect  
Among the steps that developing country governments can unitedly take at the international 
level include building a consensus on the moratorium on further strengthening of IPRs regime, 
granting flexibility to low income developing countries below a certain level of per capita 
income in implementing the provisions of TRIPS, pressurizing the TRIPS Council to consider 
ways and means to operationalize the ‘best endeavour’ nature objective and principles in respect 
of transfer and dissemination of technology to developing countries, particularly the least 
developed countries249 with the incorporation of specific provisions for transfer of technology, 
and adopting differential pricing strategies for developed and developing countries. In addition, 
one of the ways of compensating the low income countries for the adverse effects of 
strengthened IPRs regime is to provide increased technical assistance and international R&D 
funding to local enterprises to help them build local capabilities. Developed countries’ 
donation of a substantial proportion of technology license fees collected from low income 
 
248 For instance, Eli Lilly established a joint venture with Ranbaxy in the mid-1990s for development of a cost 
effective process for synthesis of Cefaclor, among other products, taking advantage of the latter’s process 
development capabilities. Similarly, Bayer contracted Ranbaxy to develop single doses formulations of its 
proprietary Ciprofloxacine. A number of leading MNEs have also contracted Indian public funded R&D 
institutions for synthesis of new molecules and process development. For more details, see Kumar, above n 4. 
249 Carlos Correa, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Transfer of Technology’ in Kevin P Gallagher (ed), Putting 
Development First: The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs (2005) 126-145. 
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countries to a fund created in the respective countries could also be possible to assist 
inventive activities of domestic enterprises. After all, developing countries should oppose any 
attempt of developed countries to introduce TRIPS plus patent regime and ever-greening of 
patents.250 
8. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis reviewed here claims that strengthening IPRS in the TRIPS web-netting agriculture 
and pharmaceuticals caries mixed economic prospects and concerns for an agriculture-prone 
and densely populated LDC like Bangladesh. The TRIPS standard-setting in relation to 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals does not help the country to fulfil subsistence needs or 
promote economic development through innovations. Because, neither the Agreement nor the 
existing Bangladesh IPRs legislations take into account the general subsistence needs and 
economic development of the great majority of poor people. However, exception clauses and 
special and differential treatment in terms of compliance deadline and technology transfer 
promises can help an LDC like Bangladesh to reverse-engineer existing knowledge products and 
supply them to home and abroad with the broader view of meeting survival needs and making 
economic progress. To qualify for such treatments, Bangladesh legislations need to streamline 
existing provisions that define patentable inventions, compulsory licensing and other 
differential treatment, and the TRIPS needs to be more specific on technology transfer 
arrangements, which are currently in paper, not in practice. 
 
 
250 Kumar, above n 4. 
